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COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY

By

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A paper submitted to the Dean of Academics, Naval War College, in consideration for the 2001 Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

European leadership convened in December 1999, at the Helsinki summit, to discuss the viability of establishing a military arm of the European Union (EU). The idea of European defense has existed since 1948 with the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU), but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) superseded its intended mission regarding European collective defense. The end of the Soviet threat and the last ten years of peace keeping operations (PKO) in the Balkans made the European leadership realize that the status quo with NATO may not be enough in the future. The goals produced at the Helsinki summit were lofty, especially for a group of nations that has heavily scaled back defense budgets and trimmed force structures since the end of the Cold War. The agreement calls for a standing rapid-reaction force (RRF) of 40,000 to 60,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen, with as many as 500 aircraft and 15 ships to fulfill the PKO tasks outlined by the WEU in 1992 at Petersberg. It requires the force to be available within 60 days and to expect deployments of up to one year. The new EU force is to be operational by 2003.¹ A total force of approximately 150,000 personnel will be required to fulfill three, four-month rotation periods.

Unfortunately the European leadership failed to clearly address, at Helsinki or any follow-on meetings, several critical issues that affect the future of its EU force, NATO, and the strong ties between Europe and the United States (US). These issues will very likely define the future of NATO and the EU-US relationship. More importantly to the US, the establishment of the EU force will play heavily on any Bush administration decisions about US grand strategy and European regional strategy. While such a force is unlikely to result in any short-term impact on US force structure and strategy in Europe, it has drawn extensive criticism from both sides of the Atlantic. Some believe it will spell the end of US primacy in Europe, the end of NATO, and

change the face of EU-US relations from cooperation to competition. Others believe that the US needs to focus its defense strategy more on the homeland, Asia or both, rather than Europe. For these individuals, giving the EU the burden of "taking care of Europe" is just the answer.

This paper examines how the US should respond to an operational EU force and how such a force might impact US strategy in Europe and internationally. The discussion does not include the likelihood of success in establishing a military element of the EU. The assumption is that the EU will eventually find a way to organize, fund, equip, and direct missions for its new defense organization. The primary assertion is that the US should embrace the rise of Europe's new defense establishment and move to a cooperative security strategy with the EU regarding European defense issues. At the same time, the US should take advantage of the next several years to transition the force technologically and organizationally in order to maintain a significant edge over any future rise by the EU to superpower status. This will give the US the option to maintain a more aggressive, grand strategy of selective engagement in the international arena. Finally, the US should cooperate with the EU by sharing advanced defense technology. This move will help reestablish the close EU-US ties enjoyed until the end of the Cold War, promote compatibility in case of NATO's future demise, and help the US defense industry remain competitive in Europe. Simply trading the US acceptance of the EU force for the EU acceptance of a US national missile defense (NMD), and then hoping for the status quo with NATO will not stand the course of time. Encouraging EU defense growth, while moving forward into the 21st century revolution in military affairs (RMA), will demonstrate a commitment to our European allies and allow the US to remain involved in the areas that affect our vital interests.

II. EUROPEAN DEFENSE

Over the years, Europe has developed, and in some cases, failed to fully develop numerous organizations for political issues, economic issues, and self-defense. Some countries maintain full membership in all of these organizations, while others maintain membership in only select structures. After the fall of the Warsaw Pact, many new nations began knocking at NATO's door for membership. The EU also maintains a long waiting list. Some desire an expanded EU and/or NATO while others fear possible side effects of expansion, such as refugee problems and unequal funding contributions by each nation. Yet, the EU was more successful than anyone imagined (especially the US and Britain) at establishing the Euro as its monetary unit; it has risen to become the world's second most powerful economic organization. The desire to organize an EU force rose from this new status, not to mention a dismal ten-year European military record in the Balkans. *The key question to be answered is not if the EU can establish its Common European Security and Defensive Policy, but how, in the long-run, does it plan on doing it; with or without the support of NATO and US military hegemony?*

The Need for the EU Force

The list of "exclusive clubs" in Europe is just short of exhausting. The most important of these includes the 19 members of NATO, 15 members of the EU, and the 11 members of the WEU. A graphic of the three organizations is contained in Appendix A. The WEU is scheduled to have its operational capabilities integrated into the EU in 2003.² This will do away with some of the problems of maintaining exclusive groups inside the greater EU membership. Keeping the WEU would have led to dissolution by the newer members of the EU. The only organization that truly provides a common military structure is NATO. With the exception of piecemeal WEU military structures, the other organizations exist mainly to ease the difficulties of crossing

borders, provide a united European effort regarding economic and environmental issues, and show some level of European solidarity. While France, and more recently Germany, promoted the existence of an EU force independent of NATO; the UK and many smaller nations have always discouraged it. Two recent factors caused the UK to reconsider its position on the issue. The first was the success of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The second was the dismal performance of European militaries in the Balkans, especially during the Kosovo conflict.

Over the years, France has always promoted the establishment of a separate European defense community (EDC). "France maintains that the US 'hyperpower' in a unipolar world is dangerous for stability."³ Until recently, the UK discouraged any such notion of an EDC, mainly due to the fact that it could hurt NATO and drive a wedge between the US and Europe. The UK also abstained from EMU membership in a desire to maintain some sovereignty and for fear that the organization would flounder. The recent successes of the EMU, however, have caused the UK to reanalyze its position in Europe. While wanting to maintain some independence, the UK desired to remain central to Europe. Prime Minister Blair surprised the rest of Europe and the US when, in 1997, he offered to lead the restructuring of the EDC. This new program was initially coined the European Strategic Defense Initiative (ESDI) and considered by the UK to be a "second choice" option in case NATO members like the US and Turkey didn't want to get involved. The UK wanted to consider ESDI as an element within and dependent upon NATO staff and resources, but France had different ideas. The French pushed, with German support, for the concept of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP); an organization independent of NATO and US decision-making, responsible only to an EU political leadership organization. Although the UK leadership initially remained split over the EDC and its impact

on NATO and US relations, the conflicts in the Balkans provided the second catalyst for changing their position.

At a European summit in Portschach, Austria in October 1998 the UK, for the first time, publicly stated that Europe's Bosnia and Kosovo policies were "unacceptable" and marked by weakness and confusion. This symbolized the first step by the EU members toward establishing a more effective military structure to back European crisis management.⁴ Another meeting followed this summit in St. Malo, France, in December 1998. "St. Malo accepted the French position that Europe's defense ambitions must be dealt with by using military substance, rather than institutional niceties."⁵ Prime minister Blair adopted the French view that a more robust EDC would not undermine, but support the transatlantic relationship with the US.

At an EU summit in Cologne, Germany in June 1999, "European governments committed themselves to a capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO."⁶ The Helsinki summit in December 1999, formalized the entire process by establishing three permanent committees within the EU Council. A political standing committee (PSC) would establish Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the CESDP, in order to drive the new organization. A Military Committee (MC) would give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC. Finally, a Military Staff (MS) would provide the PSC with military expertise and support to the CESDP. These committees as well as the proposed force structure, missions, and timelines, provided the core of the EDC. It is evident from Helsinki that the UK agreed to refer to the new structure as the CESDP, rather than ESDI. This was the first issue that caused concern for the US. The second was the agreement over missions and responsibilities the EDC should deal with.

EU Force Missions and Responsibilities

The dimensions of the EDC aren't exactly clear at this time, which is the second issue currently under close examination by the US and other "NATO only" members. Initially, the EU force was to handle regional PKO and assist with the common defense, but now the French and Germans want it to do even more. They prefer that the force be capable of providing crisis management, in addition to the other tasks. The Helsinki Council outlined that the CESDP "develop an autonomous capacity to make decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army."⁷ As it is right now, the force is really only big enough to handle smaller issues like PKO. NATO will be needed in the short-term to handle anything above a PKO level.

The second issue is what the phrase "international crises" means. This term leaves a large amount of ambiguity in the umbrella of EDC coverage. There is no doubt that the force will initially cover only European issues, but the potential exists for it to move beyond European borders into North Africa or other areas of European interest. European countries have rented strategic airlift from Ukraine and the British are in the process of procuring C-17s from the US. The potential exists, with an existing British tanker force, to make it a truly international RRF available worldwide on short notice.

The fact that the EU does not yet have the means to be wholly autonomous from NATO was outlined in Cologne. European leaders outlined three military capabilities required to further autonomous operations by the EU. Strategic transport, mentioned earlier, is the first of these. Intelligence is another area that requires improvement – NATO relied heavily on US assets during Kosovo. Third, command and control during the Kosovo conflict was largely a US effort

provided to NATO. With the European countries providing a collective defense budget that is only 60% of the US budget, it is going to be difficult to acquire these three high dollar capabilities. Further, the public doesn't support the current force structures, let alone a much larger capability anticipated by the EU force. Budget problems are only the first of two major issues faced by the EU. The second is the unwillingness of the US to provide its allies with highly technical and sophisticated equipment for their militaries. The US wants to keep an edge on the competition. Providing anyone with its best equipment risks the chance that a hostile nation may get the technology and use it against us. This problem has caused the "EU to encourage restructuring of the European defense industry to make sure that the CESDP will have a solid basis for autonomous action and not be dependent on external – mostly US – military infrastructures and equipment."⁸

Current Situation

If Europe's over-reliance on the US was not absolutely clear beforehand, the crisis in Kosovo provided painful clarity on the issue. Although many details of CESDP are still unclear and European defense budgets and force structures are falling under the axe, this hasn't stopped its forward progress. The PSC, MC, and MS are now in being, although their permanent home base is still undecided. A force generation conference was held at the end of 2000 and the EU remains convinced that the force will stand up by 2003. The US has bounced back and forth between supporting and discouraging the organization; there are arguments on both sides. How the Bush administration decides to handle the situation will definitely impact US grand and European regional strategies for the long-term.

III. US PERSPECTIVES ON CESDP

The Bush administration has stepped back from Europe during its first several months in office to examine the situation in more detail. During the Clinton administration, the establishment of CESDP was seen largely as a positive event, although many exhibited uneasiness about it. Secretaries Albright and Cohen provided official responses. They want NATO to maintain the right of first refusal before the EU engages in any form of military operations. More recently, the Bush administration appears split, with Secretary Powell promoting CESDP and Secretary Rumsfeld leading the majority of the "NATO only" camp. Congress is also divided on the issue. To make matters worse, it appears that Washington might be willing to publicly promote CESDP in order to gain European acceptance of NMD and continued support for NATO. How the Bush administration decides to fall on this matter will begin to spell the beginning of future US strategy in Europe and internationally. Treating CESDP like a bad dream will only keep the US and Europe more divided and will lead to an adversarial relationship in the not too distant future.

The Clinton Administration

The US has always encouraged Europe to "get its act together" and increase its defense spending to a level that would promote more NATO compatibility and efficiency. The Kosovo conflict further demonstrated the inability of Europe to operate effectively in contingency operations. After 50 years of complaining about budgets, it appeared to the Clinton administration that the US might finally get its wish – a more autonomous Europe that could fend for itself. When it looked like some type of EDC might actually precipitate from the European summits, however, the Clinton administration was only cautiously supportive. Secretary Cohen saw CESDP as a financial drain that NATO couldn't afford and warned the

Germans that the EU needed to “rectify the overall imbalance” on expenditure within the [NATO] alliance.⁹ Secretary Albright, in response to the St. Malo conference, declared the US position with the “three D’s policy”: *no duplication, no decoupling, and no discrimination*. Duplication referred to the fact that the EU should not build separate headquarters and infrastructure from NATO. If duplication occurred, this would lead to the decoupling, or the separation of European assets from NATO. Finally, no discrimination is the agreement that European defense should be kept within NATO (referred earlier to as ESDI), and that Europe would have access to NATO assets, but without being subject to outright American veto in each and every case.¹⁰

The Bush Administration

While the Clinton administration appeared generally positive about a heavily “NATO dependent” CESDP, the Bush administration is currently split into two camps. Secretary Powell publicly supports CESDP. He stated that the US will “support any such effort as long as it strengthens NATO and does not weaken NATO.”¹¹ He believes that CESDP will not destabilize, but complement NATO and help the EU to become a fuller partner of the US. Secretary Rumsfeld, on the other hand, is a little worried about the European force and feels that it would not be positive to NATO.¹² He stated that “the devil is in the detail and the details haven’t been worked out, but the way the planning mechanism is handled could make an enormous difference.”¹³ His reference clearly alludes to whether or not the EU force is dependent or independent of NATO structures. The mainstream of Washington opinion wants to require three specific conditions of the EU force. First of all, leaders prefer that EU force operations always involve NATO in some way. Second, they want to see it as a strictly dependent NATO entity,

used only when NATO nations prefer not to be involved. Finally, the force should only be involved in PKO.¹⁴

Recently, it appears that the US has struck a bargain with the EU regarding CESDP. Recognizing that the proposal for a US NMD was meeting harsh criticism from Europe, the Bush administration eased off somewhat with its discouraging comments about CESDP. Likewise, the EU backed off from its highly negative view of US NMD. Pundits argue that the linkage between the two is not just a coincidence, but intentional. The problem with the deal is that the US will support CESDP only if NATO won't be adversely affected.¹⁵

NATO and UN Cautious

Not surprisingly, the majority of NATO and UN leadership sides with the US view. NATO concerns parallel those of the US. Worries include France's desire to set up a separate military planning capability, how EU access to NATO assets will work, arrangements for EU-NATO consultations, and security agreements to allow EU access to NATO secrets.¹⁶ The UK and US voice these concerns the most, but non-EU, NATO members like Turkey remain highly concerned, especially if they have no vote in EU matters. The UN looks at the matter in a different way. It does see the potential benefits of such a force in terms of organization and rapid response capability. UN leaders worry, though, that it may hinder deployment of EU forces in UN PKO, making those forces unavailable if they were already committed to a European defense system.¹⁷ Finally, the political weight the US carries makes it difficult to admit the potential benefits that such a force might provide in developing a more forward-looking policy.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY

The problems generated by CESDP include fear about NATO's future and a divide in the long-lasting transatlantic alliance. European conservatives worry that the US, led by conservative Republicans, will return to the days of isolationism and look inward, leaving the rest of the world out in the cold. Finally, there will be insurmountable funding problems for European defense and worries that Europe will no longer rely on the US defense industry. These conservatives should realize that NATO and Europe are going through a period of profound transition. With the exception of the European financial woes, all of these problems are inextricably linked to the past. Next, the US should encourage the sharing of defense technology with EU nations in order to help its own defense industry and promote ongoing cooperation in Europe. Finally, The US should take advantage of this transitional period to encourage Europe to take on greater responsibility, while moving forward with the RMA in order to guarantee its future as a superpower.

Looking Backwards

It is no secret that the US relishes the strength of NATO. After all, NATO is the most powerful and respected military alliance in the world. Likewise, NATO contributed to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. However, there is no more Soviet Union. Russia could return to superpower status, but right now it is not even close. The structures, equipment, and war plans for NATO remain focused on something that no longer exists – the past. Likewise, the transatlantic partnership between Europe, Canada, and America exists for the very same reasons. The close economic and political cooperation between these nations contributed significantly to the fall of Communism.

From the European, mainly British perspective, a split in the transatlantic alliance leaves them thinking about things even more historical. They fear that America would turn away and close up its borders, ignoring cries for help if Europe were found in the face of a threat and lacking the means to deal with it. They actually believe that globalism could be shut off like a faucet and America could simply return to the inter-war period. Next, we have the European leaders who are still gun shy of the word Federalism. They see the potential tragedy of a Franco-German alliance taking control of Europe and returning to the days of the Prussian Empire; heaven forbid any discussion of this EU force as a "European army." Then there are those who simply cite the lack of funding as evidence that such a force could never succeed. The EU force will only create financial angst among the European people and the whole of the EU will fail, unable to implement military policy and weakened economically and politically. Finally, American corporations worry about Europe shutting its doors and building a Mecca of European defense to compete with and weaken US corporate ambitions internationally.

Time to Move Ahead

The problem with all of these arguments is that they are, mainly historical. NATO and the transatlantic alliances are based on a massive Soviet threat - it is time to change for a new age. Many experts feel we must stop referring to the time after the Cold War as the Post-Cold War era; it only promotes historical thinking. It is certainly important to add historic value to our strategies and military operations by studying the past, but we must also embrace the ideas of the future, just as Europe is trying to do with CESDP. For NATO to remain credible, it should embrace change or risk the chance of a grim future. Likewise, if American leaders think they can keep a strong transatlantic alliance without making major changes in policy and strategy,

they are sadly mistaken. Now is the time to sit down and brainstorm not just the potential threat, but to organize credible and efficient alliances to defend against them.

The defense funding issue for the EU is definitely a hurdle. However, the European community has never been recognized for high levels of efficiency. Just as the EMU took a long time to succeed, it will take time to become efficient. The EU rise to the position of economic superpower didn't happen immediately, so it is possible to see that efficiency can get better. When this happens, the vision of a credibly funded EU force might be just around the corner. Every growing power endures its pains. One possible solution might be for the US to share some of its defense technology with the EU in order to free up some money for funding the CESDP, rather than forcing the EU to duplicate research and development measures already underway in the US.

As for the US defense industry, its problem is also historically based. The fact that Europe turned inside of its borders for defense spending shouldn't have surprised anyone. The US has always been reluctant to share defense technology for one main reason – keeping the global lead. During the Cold War, the US felt that sharing information with allies would have led to the compromise of crucial secrets to the USSR. Maybe even a European ally would have taken advantage of the hardware to build its own equipment and become a supreme world superpower. However, it is not too difficult to see that the USSR managed to exploit many US secrets anyway. Take air power for instance. First, the US developed the F-111, F-15, and the B-1. Shortly after, the USSR developed the Flogger, Foxbat, and the Backfire; all very similar designs to their US counterparts. Yet, they didn't succeed in world domination because they managed to exploit our secret technology. Even if a European ally gained knowledge about all of our secrets, they wouldn't be developing something revolutionary – it would just be a copy of

our stuff. It is the people, organizations, and tactics that make the machine, not the machine itself.

If the US offered to share its defense technology, this would help in several ways. As mentioned previously, some of the money that Europe elected to spend on their defense research and development could be diverted to establishing CESDP and to shore up Europe's half of the NATO bill, assuming NATO survived. Second, the sharing of technology would make EU and US (and NATO) equipment more compatible. Next, the US defense industry could stop holding its breath about being locked out of Europe and work together with the EU defense industry to cross-share technologies. Finally, this more cooperative rather than guarded approach would promote even deeper global reliance, rather than competition, between the US and a future, EU superpower.

Skeptics of technology sharing point out that America stands to lose more than it would gain by sharing information. However, if America continues to sit back and avoid change, it will lose anyway. Cold War hardware, mounting modernization costs, and restricted defense budgets threaten the RMA already. The Bush administration and Secretary Rumsfeld are making difficult decisions right now about what should and shouldn't be funded. To ignore funding for the RMA would be the first step in accepting mediocrity. America has always been known for having the best defense equipment in the world – our status as a superpower relies heavily on that trademark. If we continue to hold back on sharing technology with Europe, the EU defense industry will have no choice but to develop indigenous equipment. Cooperating with the EU will not only help the US defense industry and fix compatibility issues, but will allow the US to continue funding its RMA. By applying these funds to future technologies, the US will secure its

position as a confident superpower. Finally, encouraging the EU to take care of Europe will free up even more US defense funds for technology research.

US Regional Strategy in Europe

The acceptance of CESDP implies a strategy of *cooperative security* with the EU concerning European matters. In reality, this isn't much different than US strategy in Europe since WWI. The US always looks for the consensus of its European allies prior to committing any of its forces for European operations. NATO and its North Atlantic Council have traditionally provided the forum under which Europe, Canada, and America agree upon European affairs. The degree to which US decision-making was central to Europe is the major difference between the current situation and an EU controlled force in Europe. Keep in mind that this force is only to be 60,000 strong for now. While providing some guarantee of defense, the US and for the time being, NATO will carry the "big guns" for any major threats that rise to power. If NATO remains in Europe, then it is entirely possible that the EU and US would be the two pillars of NATO. The compatibility provided by technology sharing would make the force stronger and more efficient. At a very minimum, it would force the Europeans to be more compatible with each other, even if they opted for EU defense industry technologies. This option would be more acceptable than the current situation that involves 19 defense industries attempting to merge incompatible defense equipment.

It is possible that the EU may eventually elect not to consider its US ally in decision-making matters, especially if NATO dissolved. However, the promotion of technology sharing and the very global nature of today's economy make that highly unlikely. The US will continue to hold veto power in the UN, and NATO will not disappear well into this decade. By promoting this force and cooperating with the EU, the odds are that an even stronger partnership will result.

While the EU is less interested in China and less worried about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) than the US, both camps agree on many other issues when it comes to national interests. In fact, the primary EU members are "...more concerned than the US about legitimizing their policies by international law and a UN Security Council mandate..."¹⁸ This makes the odds of ignoring US opinion much less likely. Rather, the formulation of CESDP may require France to reexamine its common counter stance with the UK and US regarding many UN Security Council votes.

US Grand Strategy

The CESDP would definitely affect US grand strategy. If the EU took much of the responsibility for Europe, this would free up US force structure and funding from Europe. While this is more likely a long-term reality, it would benefit the US immediately in two ways. First, it would allow the US to begin shifting its to the rising problems in Asia. While the US commitment in Europe is significantly less than during the Cold War, it still requires a large piece of the pie. A credible EU force in place for PKO by 2003 would allow the US to concentrate on China and the Far East, or possibly homeland defense. Second, the funding required to support heavy staffs and structures in Europe should be significant enough to aid in future modernization or funding for the RMA, depending on what the Bush administration decides. *The US could afford to be more selective on where it decided to engage internationally.* Additionally, by moving assets out of Europe, the US might not be so reliant on European leadership and opinions, although cooperating with Europe is very important when it comes to UN consensus. Finally, supporting CESDP would demonstrate US willingness to cooperate with the EU in the event that it does reach military superpower status.

For the long-term, it is possible that the international environment may change significantly. The EU might rise to the position of superpower. Insisting on the preservation of NATO and the pre-eminence of US hegemony will not prevent this from happening. If the EU acquires the budget and determination to rise to power, it will do so with or without the support of the US. The world has only experienced a truly bipolar world one time in history. Just because that relationship was adversarial does not mean that it must be the same in the future. Besides, the potential rise to power of China, Russia, or some other aggressor nation in a vital region of the world may call upon the strength of two cooperative superpowers to keep it in check. It is already evident that the US no longer has the means to fight two major theater wars. Cooperating with an empowered EU would give the US the second leg it needs to stand firm in the global environment well into the 21st century. Sticking to the virtues and ideas of the past has resulted in the demise of many nations, to include Greece, Rome, and even the Soviet Union. The US leadership would be well advised to view Europe based on an EU-centered future rather than a NATO-centered past.

V. CONCLUSION

One should not forget that a decade ago the debate over Europe's single currency was about "whether" it could ever become reality, whereas in 2000, we are talking about "how" to make it a success. A similar shift from "whether" to "how" has occurred in the debate on European defense, now that "Kosovo" has broken down many old shibboleths against joint Europe-led military operations.¹⁹

-Peter van Ham

While the establishment of a European force remains somewhat speculative, it is far from unrealistic. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact questions the continued existence of NATO in the not too distant future. The desires of England, France, and Germany to establish a credible defense force to back the economic and political strength of the EU is not in the least bit surprising. It should have, in fact, been anticipated as the next logical step for European unification. Much like the US establishment of the NSC, DOD, and CINC command structure, the EU, in the form of the PSC, MC, and MS is finally moving toward establishing a credible European defense community. The US can argue against such an organization, but would be ill advised to do so. It looks like CESDP will happen with or without the blessing of the US.

If America embraces the objectives of CESDP, it stands to benefit in more ways than one. Promoting the establishment of the European force will assist in furthering EU-US defense compatibility and a more equal sharing of responsibilities, among other things. More importantly, it will allow the US to refocus long-term strategies in Asia and the homeland, while feeling secure that a credible force is handling Europe. If Europe decides that it doesn't need NATO, America should be ready to support the change in strategy. As a minimum, the US should at least be ready to defend NATO based on credible arguments that pertain to the future and not the past. Finally, promoting CESDP will encourage the US to remain less dependent upon NATO alliances, the EU to remain less dependent on the US, and both of them to remain more trusting of each other well into the 21st century.

APPENDIX A: PRIMARY EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS²⁰

Peter van Ham

Membership

NATO

Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway,
Poland, Turkey, United States

EU

Denmark

WEU*

Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain,
United Kingdom

Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland

*WEU:

Associate Members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey

Associate Partners: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia

Observers: Denmark, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden

APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS

CESDP.....	Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFSP.....	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EDC.....	European Defense Community
EMU.....	European Monetary Union
ESDI.....	European Security and Defense Initiative
EU.....	European Union
MC.....	Military Committee
MS.....	Military Staff
NAC.....	North Atlantic Council
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMD.....	National Missile Defense
PKO.....	Peace Keeping Operations
PSC.....	Political and Security Committee
RMA.....	Revolution in Military Affairs
RRF.....	Rapid Reaction Force
US.....	United States of America
WEU.....	Western European Union
WMD.....	Weapons of Mass Destruction

NOTES

¹Peter van Ham, "Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia," The Marshall Center Papers, no.1 (George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2000), 11.

²"Implementation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and WEU's Future Role," Assembly of the WEU, Reply to the Annual Report of the Council, 30 November 2000, p. 34. <<http://assembly.weu.int/eng/reports/1720c.html>> [9 May 2001]

³"NATO Battles EU over Defence," CNN.Com, 14 December 2000, p. 2, <<http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/12/14/belgium.nato/index.html>> [23 March 2001].

⁴Ham, p. 5.

⁵Ibid., p. 6.

⁶Ibid., p. 9.

⁷Jolyon Howarth, European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge, annex A, (WEU: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, September 2000), Annex A.

⁸Ham, p. 12.

⁹Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howarth, Terry Terriff, and Mark Weber, "Nato's Triple challenge," International Affairs, July 2000, p. 509.

¹⁰Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, "St. Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1999, p. 69.

¹¹Guenter Burghardt, "The Future of the European Union," European Union in the US, 23 January 2001, pg. 11. <<http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2001/010129gb.htm>> [23 March 2001].

¹²David Wastell, "Powell and Rumsfeld at Odds over Euro Army," Telegraph Group Limited, 11 February 2001, pg. 1. <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=004658562765294&rtmo>> [29 March 2001].

¹³Joe Murphy, "US launches Attack on Euro Army," Telegraph Group Limited, 18 March 2001, <<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=004658562765294&rtmo>> [29 March 2001].

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶"NATO Battles EU over Defence," p. 2.

¹⁷"UN Hopes EU Force Does Not Hinder Peacekeeping," Reuters, 19 March 2001, p. 1. <<http://news.lycos.com/headlines/World/article.asp?docid=RTINTERNATIONAL-EU-PEACE>> [23 March 2001].

¹⁸Ham, p. 22.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 35.

²⁰Ibid., p. 4.

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